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Abstract. This paper purports to apply the Kydland-Prescott framework of dynamic 
inconsistency to the case of fiscal policy, by considering the trade-off between output 
and debt stabilization. The Government budget constraint provides the link between 
debt dynamics and the level of activity, influenced by fiscal policy. Contrary to what 
happens in the monetary policy framework, however, a commitment is not always 
superior to discretion, even in the absence of uncertainty, but only when the public 
debt-GDP ratio is sufficiently large. The introduction of uncertainty, as usual, implies a 
reduction in the net benefit generated by the adoption of a fixed rule. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of fiscal policy as a stabilizing tool implies a typical trade-off between output 
growth and a deterioration of public finances, possibly leading to an undesirable increase in the 
public debt-GDP ratio. The negative consequences of this trade-off have been recently 
experienced by many economies. In Europe, for instance, a few countries violated the budget 
requirements established by the Growth and Stability Pact in order to stimulate output growth 
and promote a recovery after a long period of slump. This, however, led to an increase in 
public debts, relative to GDP, which is particularly worrisome in the case of countries, like 
Italy, where the current ratio is very high and where a ten-year historical tendency of reduction 
has been interrupted. A similar experience of budget deterioration and public debt increase has 
been experienced by the United States, where a strong countercyclical fiscal policy has been 
adopted since the beginning of the new century, and by Japan, where the long fight against the 
stagnation begun in the 1990’s has led the public debt-GDP ratio to reach an astonishingly high 
value. 
The recent episodes of rising public debts have given a new stimulus to the economic 
debate about debt sustainability and the opportunity to adopt rules rather than discretion in the 
conduct of fiscal policy.
1  
A large public finance literature highlights many reasons, of differing nature, behind the 
suggestion to impose constraints on fiscal policy. First of all, the theory of fiscal 
constitutionalism, attributable to the Public Choice School (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977), 
suggests that the Government budget should be balanced because of the distorsions and costs 
implicit in deficit financing. The crowding out argument (Carlson and Spencer, 1975) suggests 
that the creation of a budget deficit ultimately leads to an increase in the interest rate that 
displaces productive private investment, while leaving output unchanged. The principle of 
                                                 
1  This debate has been particularly heated in Europe, where, as we said, the prescriptions of the Growth and 
Stability Pact have been violated and then institutionally relaxed. For a recent position on this debate see also 
Wyplosz  (2005).   3
Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974) arrives at the same final suggestion of the desirability of a 
balanced budget on the theoretical ground that Government deficits are wholly ineffective. The 
golden rule of public finance, instead, admits the possibility of a public deficit, of an amount 
equal to the value of net public investment.
2 Finally, the vast literature on public debt 
sustainability, which can even be dated back to an old work by Domar (1944), and has returned 
to public attention with the seminal contribution by Sargent and Wallace (1976), suggests that 
Government budgets should be targeted to the goal of stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio, in order 
to avoid the harmful long run and short run consequences of the potential crises connected to 
an ever-increasing debt-GDP ratio.
3 
The previous discussion outlines the existence of several different arguments behind the 
suggestion to impose rules on fiscal policy; also, from a practical point of view, specific 
criteria have been defined in order to identify the desirable features of “good rules” (Kopits and 
Symansky, 1998). To our knowledge, however, no attempt has been made until now to derive 
the prescription for imposing constraints on fiscal policy from the “rules versus discretion” 
framework, as it has been successfully applied to the case of monetary policy (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983).
4 As  well known, according to this approach 
                                                 
2 It has been suggested that the golden rule of public finance might be one of the rational arguments behind the 
Maastricht Treaty prescription of a 3% upper limit to the public deficit-GDP ratio, where the actual figure 
corresponds to the average incidence of public investment on output at the time when the Treaty was signed 
(Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini, 1993). For a recent discussion about the possibility and consequences of the 
application of the golden rule in EMU cf. Balassone and Franco (2000). 
3 The original argument by Sargent and Wallace warned against the possibility that under fiscal dominance a 
given sequence of Government deficits would ultimately lead to debt monetization, which would inevitably 
generate inflation (that under rational expectations would occur immediately). The subsequent debate also 
emphasized the possibility of Government insolvency and thus the possibility that public debt might be ultimately 
consolidated or repudiated. Again, in a world of forward-looking agents, this possible long-run outcome would be 
anticipated and might give rise to short-run financial crises (for a recent reassessment of the debt sustainability 
issue, cf. Blanchard et al., 1990).  It is worth noticing again that one of the possible rationalizations of the 
Maastricht Treaty requirement on public debt is that, in order to avoid financial crises and bailing-out, every 
member country of EMU should at least stabilize the debt-GDP ratio: given the existing relationship between debt 
dynamics and deficit, this would justify the twin prescriptions in terms of public debts and deficits (respectively 
60% and 3% of GDP), under the hypothesis that inflation is around 2% and output growth 3% (cf. Buiter, Corsetti 
and Roubini, 1993). Finally it should be emphasized that limits to fiscal policy have been recently devised not 
only in EMU, but also in other countries, such as the US, the UK, New Zealand, Chile and Brazil.  
4 A different approach to time inconsistency in fiscal policy is proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and 
Persson and Svensson (1989) within a political economy framework of partisan models where political parties 
have different preferences. We shall say something more on this point in the last section of this paper.   4
monetary policy should follow fixed rules, rather than discretion, in order to avoid the 
inflationary bias generated by the monetary authorities incentive to behave opportunistically by 
trying to stabilize output above the natural level rather than commit themselves to maintaining 
a low and stable rate of inflation. In a world of rational expectations, this incentive is 
understood by optimizing agents who fix their labour contracts by anticipating the behaviour of 
monetary authorities and thus the correct rate of future inflation. The result of this game 
between rational agents and monetary authorities is the achievement of a suboptimal (third 
best) equilibrium where output is at its natural level and the rate of inflation is higher than 
under commitment. Thus monetary policy is dynamically inconsistent, and this provides a 
strong argument in favour of a rule constraining the Central Bank to pursue a low and stable 
inflation rate. This conclusion is only partially mitigated by the consideration of uncertainty: in 
the presence of supply shocks there is indeed a trade-off between rigour and flexibility, i.e. 
between the benefits of a fixed rule in reducing the “inflation bias” and the income losses due 
to the inability of monetary authorities to stabilize output under a more discretionary regime 
(Rogoff, 1985).  
The purpose of this paper is to apply the Kydland-Prescott framework of dynamic 
inconsistency to the case of fiscal policy, by considering the trade-off between output and debt 
stabilization under the constraint given by the equation describing debt dynamics, under the 
hypothesis of the existence of a risk premium on the yield of public bonds tied to the 
possibility of a default. The model will show, in particular, that, when the Government wants 
to increase the level of output beyond its equilibrium level, a public announcement to pursue 
debt stabilization proves to be a second-best solution and involves a problem of time 
inconsistency. Similarly to what happens in the Barro-Gordon (1983) model, then, the 
opportunistic incentive to forsake debt stabilization and increase output will be completely 
anticipated by rational agents, thus generating a “deficit bias”, aggravated by the additional   5
burden to the Government deficit, due to the increase in the interest rate premium required to 
finance a growing debt-output ratio.  
Unlike in the case of monetary policy, however, this outcome does not necessarily 
imply the univocal conclusion that the adoption of a fixed policy rule is always superior to 
discretion even in the absence of uncertainty. Indeed it will be shown that, in the case of fiscal 
policy and in a deterministic framework, fiscal time inconsistency suggests the opportunity to 
limit Government choices only when the public debt is sufficiently large; on the contrary, 
discretion is a better solution in the opposite case of a small debt. This result is coherent with 
the nature of the problem actually met in the implementation of expansionary fiscal policies, 
whereby the negative effects of such policies on the Government budget and debt are stronger 
when public finances are already structurally disordered.  
Finally, it will be shown that, similarly to what occurs in the dynamic inconsistency 
framework concerning monetary policy, the introduction of uncertainty implies a reduction in 
the net benefit generated by the adoption of a fixed rule because of the loss triggered by the 
commitment to forsake an output-stabilizing discretionary policy in the presence of random 
shocks. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two outlines the main assumptions of 
the model and examines the elements characterizing Government behaviour. Section three 
compares the results obtained in the case of a discretionary policy against a commitment to a 
fixed rule. Section four studies the implications of random shocks. Section five concludes. 
 
2. The model 
In this section we examine the basic features of the economy and the elements 
describing Government behaviour. We start by considering the equation describing public debt   6
dynamics, given by the usual Government budget constraint, under the hypothesis that no 
monetization is possible. Thus:
5 
1 t t t 1 t t B r D B B − − + = −                                                           [1] 
where Bt is the stock of outstanding public debt at time t, Dt is the primary deficit (i.e. the 
deficit net of interest payments) and rt is real interest rate. Relating both sides of eq. (1) to the 
level of output Yt, we get the well-known equation describing the dynamics of the debt-output 
ratio, given by:
6 
( ) 1 t t t t 1 t t t b g r d b b b − − − + = − = ∆                  [ 2 ]  
where lower case letters indicate the derived ratios, so that  t t t Y B b =  and  t t t Y D d = , 
while gt is output growth. 
We assume that the real interest rate paid on Government bonds incorporates a risk 
premium. Under this hypothesis, the bonds yield is given by: 
e
tt t rr γ(∆b) =+  with γ>0                            [3] 
where  t r  is the rate of interest that would prevail in the absence of a default risk and the 
function  e
t γ(∆b)  indicates the risk premium attributable to expected debt growth  e
t ∆b  (it might 
be plausible to assume that γ is also an increasing function of  e
t ∆b ; this further assumption, 
however, is not relevant for our results). If agents expect public debt to be constant or 
decreasing over time (i.e. if  e
t ∆b0 ≤ ) then they will exclude the chance of a default and γ = 0. 
If agents instead expect public debt to increase (i.e. if  e
t ∆b0 > ) then there will be a default risk 
and γ > 0.  Agents are assumed to pursue an optimal allocation of wealth among different 
                                                 
5 It is worth noticing that all variables are expressed in real terms; in our framework we do not deal with the 
determination of the absolute price level which is not relevant for our purposes. 
6 Eq. (2) is obtained under the usual approximation that  ( ) ( ) tt tt t r- g= r- g 1 + g .   7
existing financial assets, which implies, ceteris paribus, a lower demand for public bonds when 
they turn out to be a risky asset.
7  
We assume that only one good is produced in the economy. We also assume for 
simplicity that an increase in the Government deficit is determined by a corresponding 
reduction in taxes. A lower level of taxation generates effects both on the demand and on the 
supply-side of the economy that can be analysed through the appropriate market-clearing 
condition: 
() () ( )
e
tt t tt t t CT, r (b + IT, r + G= YT +γ∆        [ 4 ]  
where Ct is consumption, It investment, Tt taxes, Gt Government expenditure, Yt output, and 
where  t
t
dC <0 dT  ,  t
t
dC <0 dr ,  t
t
dI <0 dT , t
t
dI <0 dr ,
8 and  t
t
dY <0 dT .  
From the supply-side perspective (right-hand side of eq. (4)), assuming that taxes are at 
least partially distortionary, a reduction in Tt will determine an increase in the output level, 
triggered by a higher labour supply. From the demand-side perspective (left-hand side of eq. 
(4)) a reduction in taxes will increase both consumption (if Ricardian equivalence does not 
fully hold, for instance because at least some consumers are myopic (Campbell and Mankiw, 
1989) or liquidity constrained) and investment (if entrepreneurial decisions on capital 
accumulation depend on the internal rate of return net of taxes).
9 Market clearing between 
demand and supply is ensured by the adjustment of  t r , which will affect both consumption and 
investment decisions.  
                                                 
7 It might be argued that the risk premium on public bonds depends not only upon the expected debt growth but 
also upon the debt size. This latter effect would be justified by the fact that, given debt dynamics, the probability 
of default is higher when the public debt is larger. If this additional influence were considered, equation [3] would 
become  e
tt t t - 1 rr γ(∆b, b ) =+ ; the new formulation, however, would not change the basic results of the paper, as it 
can be easily checked from the analysis presented in the next section. 
8 It would be plausible to assume that investment depends upon the specific risk premium paid on private bonds. 
The size of this premium, however, is not relevant for our analysis. 
9 Similar effects on demand and supply would occur if the assumed increase in the public deficit were due to a rise 
in Government expenditure, under the hypothesis that Government purchases have a positive influence on input 
productivity.   8
If Government spending  is supposed to be constant, then eq. (4) implies that
10: 
() t t D f Y =    with f ’>0                   [5] 
According to eq. (5), given our previous definitions, we have  () t t t D f D d =  and 
() [] 1 t 1 t t t Y Y D f g − − − = . By substituting these results and eq. (3) in eq. (2) we get then: 
()
e
tt t t 1 ∆bh ( D ) γ∆ bb − =+              [ 6 ]  
where  () () () ttt t 1 t t t 1 t 1 h(D ) D f D b r D f D Y Y −− − ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . The equilibrium rate t r  will 
be a function of Dt since, as it follows from the previous arguments, a change in the 
Government deficit will affect the market clearing condition (4)
11. 
Let us assume now that the Government pursues two different goals: output and debt 
stabilization
12. The introduction of the latter objective in the Government loss function may 
appear unusual; however the assumption can be easily justified if we suppose, as in the debt 
sustainability literature, that an economy with a growing public debt exhibits a positive risk of 
default.  Since the chance of a default generates disutility to the society as a whole, then debt 
stabilization may be considered, as it actually is, a fundamental goal for the Government. 
Let us define, as usual, Y* as the desired level of output and  * b ∆ as the optimal value 
of debt dynamics. We assume, as in the Kydland-Prescott framework, that Y* is higher than Yt 
because of the existence of distortions in the tax system and in the labour market.  In line with 
previous arguments, we finally assume that  0 b* = ∆ , so that the Government wants to stabilize 
                                                 
10 In our model, since the effects of tax cuts on output ultimately depend upon the supply-side of the economy (as  
eq. (4) clearly shows), the so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy are irrelevant.  
11 In our model while a tax cut unambiguously raises income, it has no definite effect on the market clearing rate 
of interest. If however the effect of taxes on demand is higher than that on supply, then the rate of interest will 
definitely rise. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (1999) and 
Ohaian, Raffo and Rogerson (2006) from the supply-side, and of Perotti (2006) and especially Favero and 
Giavazzi (2007), from the demand-side. 
12 Actually one might also assume that, especially in the case of countries with a high debt-output ratio, the second 
goal might be represented by debt reduction; this hypothesis, however, would not alter the conclusions reached 
under the assumption that the Government pursues debt stabilization.   9
the debt-output ratio as a sufficient condition for debt sustainability. Under these assumptions 
the Government loss function can be written as: 
[] [ ]
22
tt L=a ∆b+ Y - Y *              [ 7 ]  




tt t t - 1t LD = ah ( D) + γ∆ bb + f D- Y * ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦                [8] 
The properties of eq. (8) can be derived from those of function h(Dt), whose form 
depends upon that of function f(Dt) in eq. (5). In general, one cannot say whether h(Dt) is an 
increasing, decreasing or even non-monotone function of Dt since this will depend upon the 
effects of an increase in the Government deficit on Bt and Yt respectively. 
From now on, however, we shall make an explicit hypothesis about the monotonicity of 
h(Dt) by assuming h'>0 (thus implying that an expansion in the primary deficit will determine 
an increase in the debt-output ratio). This assumption may be justified on many different 
grounds. First of all, if it were h'<0, then a rise in the primary deficit would cause a reduction 
in the debt-output ratio; this case does not seem interesting or relevant, since it would imply 
that the Government, by expanding the public deficit, could at the same time raise growth and 
reduce the debt-output ratio. Secondly, the assumption that h'>0 seems to be confirmed both 
by the actual experience of a few industrial countries and by the results of some recent 
empirical studies concerning the effects of Government taxation on output.
13   
                                                 
13 The possible occurrence of Laffer effects connected to the adoption of tax cuts is clearly rejected by the actual 
experience of the United States, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and of Japan, both in the 1990’s and 
in the most recent years of the new decade. In these cases tax reductions led to a substantial worsening of  the 
Government deficit and a strong upsurge of the debt-output ratio. 
From an empirical standpoint, a series of recent papers purporting to estimate the effects on output of tax 
reductions (but also of expenditure increases) have come to the conclusion that these effects are small and that 
they also tend to reduce in size if the most recent years are considered (such as the period after 1980) and if the 
dynamics of the debt-output ratio is explicitly introduced into the analysis (cf. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
Perotti (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2007)).    10




tt t t - 1 t t ah' D h(D )+γ(∆b) b = - f  'D f D - Y * ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦            [9] 
Let us label D
opt as the optimal level of Dt satisfying eq. (9). 
Let us define now D
st as the level of Dt that ensures public debt stabilization, i.e. ∆bt=0. 
This level is given by the condition: 
()
st e
tt 1 h(D ) γ∆ bb − =−                          [10] 
It is easy to see that if Dt=D
st then the left-hand side of eq. (9) is zero; hence condition 
(9) will be satisfied only if its right-hand side is also zero, i.e. if Y*=f(D
st). In this case, then, 




Let us assume now that Y*>f(D
st). This assumption introduces a trade-off between the 
goal of reaching the desired output level and that of stabilizing public debt. Indeed, when 
Y*>f(D
st) the right-hand side of eq. (9) is positive, implying that  ()
opt e
tt 1 h(D ) γ∆ bb − >− . Since 
h(Dt) is by definition an increasing function, this implies that D
opt>D
st, meaning that the 
Government chooses to increase the deficit in order to push output closer to its desired level. 
This behaviour, which stems from the assumed trade-off between the two conflicting 
objectives of output and debt stabilization, will however generate a case of dynamic 
inconsistency, as described in the next section.  
 
3. Rules versus discretion 
Within the framework illustrated in the previous section, we can compare the outcomes 
of the two alternative cases of a discretional choice made by the Government and of a rule 
                                                 
14 It is worth noticing that minimization is possible if functions h(.) and f(.) ensure that the necessary second order 
conditions are satisfied. For this reason we also introduce the technical assumptions that h''>0 and f''>0.    11
compelling fiscal policy to stabilize public debt.  In the case of discretion we assume that the 
Government declares that it will pursue public debt stabilization and hence choose the 
subsequent level of deficit given its preferences described by the loss function L(Dt). As in the 
usual time inconsistency literature,  we shall consider both the case in which the Government 
announcement is trusted (corresponding to the so-called case of “fooling”) and the case where 
it is not. We shall thus compare three situations: 
1) Discretion and fooling (i.e.  opt f
t DD D ==  and  e
t ∆b0 = ) 
2) Discretion and rational expectations on public debt dynamics (i.e.  opt d
t DD D == and 
ed
tt ∆b ∆b= ∆b = ) 
3) Commitment (i.e.  st c
t DD D == and  e
tt ∆b ∆b= 0 = ). 
In the first case the Government announcement of debt stabilization is assumed to be 
believed. The Government then will choose the optimal level of Dt under the condition 
e




ff f f a h 'D hD = - f  'D fD - Y * ⎡⎤
⎣⎦                [11] 
As previously explained, since Y*>f(D
st), we have that D
f>D
st. This means that agents 
expectations about debt stabilization ( e
t ∆b0 = ) are wrong, since the Government choice 
implies that ∆bt>0. If agents are supposed to have rational expectations, then, D
f cannot be an 
equilibrium level of Dt. 
If agents have rational expectations, however, they will not trust the Government 
announcement and will instead anticipate its actual choice and behaviour. In this case we shall   12
have  e
tt ∆b ∆b = ,
15 implying that the optimal level of Dt (labelled in this case D
d) is given by 
the condition: 
() () ( )
dd d d
tt - 1 ah' D h(D )+γ(∆b) b = - f  'D f D - Y * ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦           [12] 
Comparing the loss suffered by the Government when Dt is equal to D
f or D
d, it is easy 
to see that L(D
d)>L(D
f). Indeed, since  tt 1 (b ) b 0 − γ∆ >  and since D
f is the optimal choice in the 
case where  e
t ∆b0 = , we have that: 
 
() () ( )
()
() ()
2 2 dd d
tt - 1
2 2 dd
2 2 ff f
LD = ah ( D) + γ∆ bb + f D- Y *>
ah ( D) +fD - Y * >
ah ( D) +fD - Y * = LD
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
          [13]  
The meaning of this result is straightforward. In equilibrium, agents will anticipate the 
growth of public debt and will ask for a risk premium that will increase the interest rate paid on 
public bonds. This additional interest payment will raise the Government loss with respect to 
the case of fooling. 
Finally we can study the case in which the Government has a binding commitment to 
stabilize the debt-output ratio. In this case the Government will follow the rule Dt=D
st (labelled 
in this case D
c), implying ∆bt=0 and, under rational expectations,  e
t ∆b0 = . It is easy to see that 
the value of the loss function in this case will be: 
() ()
2
cc LD =fD - Y * ⎡⎤
⎣⎦              [ 1 4 ]  
                                                 
15 In the Kydland-Prescott framework private agents optimal strategy is to do their best to forecast inflation in 
order to avoid the income losses due to an underestimation of the future change in prices that will influence their 
real wage in the process of wage bargaining. In our model private agents optimal strategy is to do their best to 
forecast the future dynamics of public debt in order to avoid the capital loss due to an underestimation of the risk 
premium embodied in the interest rate that will  influence their real return on bonds in the process of deciding the 
optimal composition of their portfolios.   13
We can now compare the value of loss function in the case of discretion L(D
d), 
corresponding to the first row of inequality (13), with that in eq. (14) in order to see whether 




() () () () ()
22 2 dc d d c
tt - 1 L D -L D =a h(D )+γ∆ bb +f D- Y *- f D- Y * ⎧ ⎫ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎨ ⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭
    [15]                                        
It is clear that, since ∆bt>0  when Dt=D
d , then the first term in the right-hand side of 
eq. (15) is positive while, since  ( ) ( )
dc Y*>f D >f D , the second term is negative. This result 
implies that, in general, we cannot say whether commitment is better or worse than discretion. 
This occurs because the two choices involve differentiated advantages: discretion entails larger 
interest payments due to the risk premium but a level of output closer to the desired value, 
while commitment implies lower interest payments, due to the absence of the risk premium, 
but also a lower level of output. 
It is interesting to notice that this conclusion differs from that obtained in the 
application of the dynamic inconsistency approach to monetary policy. As pointed out by 
Barro and Gordon (1983), in the case of monetary policy, discretion generates an inflation bias 
with an unchanged output; thus, in that framework, commitment is always preferable (the 
second-best solution). In the case of fiscal policy, the difference in the conclusion is due to the 
fact that in our model the equilibrium level of output is higher under discretion because of the 
positive effects of fiscal policy on production. 
Although in general commitment can either reduce or increase the loss function, a clear 
conclusion as to its superiority can be drawn on the basis of the value of the inherited debt-
output ratio bt-1. In fact, eq. (15) implies the following:   14
Proposition 1.  : b ˆ ∃  if  b ˆ b 1 t < −  then  ( ) ( )
dc LD > LD , if  b ˆ b 1 t = −  then  ()()
dc LD = LD  and if 
b ˆ b 1 t > −  then  ()()
dc LD < LD (see Appendix A for the proof). 
This result indicates that there is a threshold level of the debt-output ratiob ˆ  which, 
when exceeded, makes commitment more desirable. We can therefore conclude that if the 
debt-output ratio in the economy is small, then discretion is preferable, while, on the contrary, 
commitment is a better alternative for highly indebted economies.  
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. The size of the inherited debt-output 
ratio (bt-1) influences the value of the additional interest payments incurred in the case of 
discretion. If bt-1 is small, then the increase in interests payments will also be small and the 
advantage related to a larger level of output under discretion will  prevail. On the contrary, if  
bt-1  is high enough, then the increase in interest payments will also be large and the 
disadvantage connected to the risk premium paid under discretion will overcome the advantage 
deriving from a higher level of output.  
An inspection of eq. (15) shows that the threshold value of b ˆ depends upon many 
features of the economy and upon Government preferences. Two elements seem however to be 
more relevant. This leads us to the following result: 
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus the value of b ˆ  is decreasing in t (b ) γ∆ and in a. 
A larger risk premium connected to a non-stabilized debt entails a larger interest cost 
for each unit of outstanding debt; this implies that a lower threshold debt is sufficient to make 
discretion disadvantageous. On the other hand, a Government more interested in debt 
stabilization (i.e. having a higher a) makes the relative cost of commitment lower; this implies 
that discretion is disadvantageous only if the total cost due to the risk premium is also lower, 
i.e. if, ceteris paribus, b ˆ is reduced.   15
The conclusions just reached about the relative desirability of discretion and 
commitment can be illustrated with the help of a graphical analysis (figures 1 and 2). The BY 
schedules represent the trade-off between public debt stabilization and output implied by 
equations (5) and (6).
16 The two schedules drawn refer respectively to the case where the 
expected debt growth is null ( e
t ∆b0 = : BY0) and to the case where the expected debt growth 
corresponds to the discretionary outcome ( ed
t ∆b ∆b = : BY1); thus the distance between any 
two curves is given by the additional interest payments paid on Government bonds, due to a 
varying risk premium.
17 Along each BY schedule agents expectations about debt dynamics are 
given and may be wrong; the EL schedule, instead, represents the locus of all possible 
equilibria under rational expectations, i.e. the locus of all combinations between ∆b and Y for 
which  e
tt ∆b ∆b = .
18 As a consequence of the assumptions made, the slope of the EL schedule 
is steeper than that of the BY schedules, and will, ceteris paribus, be increasing in the size of 
the risk premium and the value of Government debt.
19 In the two figures the L curves represent 
the Government indifference (or iso-loss) curves: along each curve Government loss is 
unchanged, while a curve closer to the axes origin involves a lower loss.   
                                                 
16 Thus the BY schedules are defined by the condition  ( )
-1 e
tt t t - 1 ∆b= hf ( Y)+ γ∆ bb ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ . In the graphs, for the sake 
of simplicity, the schedules are assumed to be linear, as if they were of the form   e
tt t - 1 t ∆b=  +  Y+ γb ∆b αβ . 
17 Actually there are infinite BY schedules, one for every value of agents expectations about public debt dynamics, 
and the distance between any two BY schedules is given by  ( )
e
tt - 1 γ ∆bb. In our framework, therefore, the BY 
schedules are the equivalent of the expectations-augmented Phillips curves used in the traditional time-
inconsistency approach to monetary policy.  
18 Thus the EL schedule is given by the condition  ()
-1
tt t t - 1 ∆b= hf ( Y)+ γ∆ bb ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ , which, in the linear case, would 
take the form  tt
t-1 t-1
αβ
∆b=  +  Y
1-γb1 - γb
.  In our framework, therefore, the EL schedule is the equivalent of the 
long-run vertical Phillips curve.  
 






, which, in the linear case, would 





. Assuming γ’bt-1 (or γbt-1 in the linear case) to be less than one, the slope of 
the EL schedule is necessarily steeper than that of the BY schedules.   16
In the case of discretion the Government declares that it will stabilize public debt and 
choose the level of Dt (and thus the levels of ∆bt and Yt) so as to minimize its loss. If the 
Government is trusted, and agents may therefore be fooled, the equilibrium that will be reached 
is represented by point F in figure 1 and figure 2. In point F, however, the deficit is too large 
for debt stabilization and public debt grows; this implies that agents expectations ( e
t ∆b0 = ) are 
wrong. Since, however, rational agents will anticipate that the Government will renege on its 
announcement, the statement will not be trusted and agents will expect public debt to grow 
( ed
tt ∆b ∆b ∆b ==). This rational expectation implies that equilibrium under discretion will be 
in point D instead of point F. The loss suffered in point D is always larger than that in point F, 
as shown in both figures 1 and 2, since point F represents the Government first-best outcome. 
In the case of commitment the Government is compelled to stabilize public debt by 
choosing D=D
c. Because of the commitment, the Government is trusted and the equilibrium 
will be in point C along the BY0 line. The comparison between points C and D confirms that in 
general we cannot say whether commitment is better or worse than discretion. However, as 
illustrated in the previous discussion and as stated in Proposition 1, the comparison between 
the loss suffered in points C and D will, ceteris paribus, depend upon the size of bt-1. If bt-1 is 
large enough, then the slope of the EL schedule will be steeper and the distance between the 
two BY schedules will be wider, so that the loss in point D will be higher than in point C, 
making commitment preferable (figure 1). The opposite situation will occur, ceteris paribus, 
when bt-1 is small, so that the slope of the EL schedule will be flatter and the distance between 
the two BY schedules narrower: in that case the loss in point D will be smaller than in point C, 
making discretion preferable (figure 2).
20 
 
                                                 
20 It is worth noticing that, as in the traditional time inconsistency framework applied to monetary policy, the 
discretionary outcome may be derived, in a game-theory approach, as the intersection between the private agents 
reaction function, given by the EL schedule, and the Government reaction function, given by the GRF schedule, 
which is defined as the locus of all tangency points between the iso-loss curves and the BY schedules.    17
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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4. A possible extension of the basic model: the effects of exogenous shocks 
The model studied in section three assumes that there are no random shocks in the 
economy. The time inconsistency literature applied to monetary policy, however, shows that 
the presence of uncertainty is important in influencing the conclusions about the relative 
desirability of rules versus discretion (cf. Rogoff, 1985). In that framework, in particular, the 
existence of shocks provides an argument in favour of discretion since a countercyclical 
monetary policy can reduce the output loss triggered by an adverse supply shock. In this 
section we show that a partially similar conclusion is true also with reference to fiscal policy, 
since the threshold level of debt b ˆ , under which discretion is superior to commitment, turns 
out to be higher under uncertainty.  
In order to draw this conclusion we re-examine the model of the previous section and 
introduce the possibility of exogenous random shocks. Therefore we assume that eq. (5) is 
substituted by: 
() tt t Yf D =+ ε                [ 1 6 ]      
where ε ~ is a random variable with a null expected value and a known variance σ
2, which can 
represent either a demand or a supply shock.  
The Government expected loss function in this case becomes: 
  () () () { }
2 2 e
tt t t - 1 t t ELD = Eah ( D ) + γ∆ bb + f D- Y * + ε ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦            [17] 
Let us suppose now, as is normally done in the time inconsistency literature, that agents 
form their expectations before the realization of  t ε  , while the Government chooses Dt after this   18
realization. Let us label D
u  the value of Dt minimizing the loss function. Its value is 
determined by the condition: 
() () ( )
uu e u u
tt - 1 t ah' D h(D )+γ(∆b) b = - f  'D f D - Y * + ε ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦         [18] 
where ετ is the realization of the random variable  t ε  . 
It is worth noticing that the term  e
tt 1 γ(∆b) b− in eq. (18) is the same as in the case of 
discretion without uncertainty (eq. (12)), since agents do not know the realization of εt and 
form their expectations by setting  t E0 ε=  . 
A comparison between eqs. (12) and (18) shows that: 
ud
t DD ( ) =+ ϕ ε                               [19] 
where ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ(εt)<0 when  εt>0, ϕ(εt)>0 when  εt<0, and ϕ’(εt)<0.  Obviously, when there 
are no shocks, the optimal Government choice is the same as that reached in the absence of 
uncertainty. When there is a positive shock, instead, the output level will be larger (and closer 
to the desired level), so that the Government will reduce the deficit in order to decrease the 
growth of public debt. When there is a negative shock, the opposite conclusion holds. 
In order to see the effects of uncertainty upon the relative desirability of rules versus 
discretion we have to compare the difference  ( ) ( )
dc L D -L D  with  () ()
uc ELD - ELD ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ , 
where  ( ) [] u D L E is the expected loss when Dt=D
u, and ( )
c ELD ⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦  is the expected loss under 
commitment. This comparison leads to the following result: 
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus, the threshold level b ˆ , defined in Proposition 1, is higher under 
uncertainty (see Appendix B for the proof).   19
The explanation of proposition 3 is quite simple. The presence of (an adverse) shock 
affects the level of output by generating a cost that is considered in the loss function. Under 
discretion the Government can reduce this cost by choosing an optimal policy that takes into 
account the effect of the shock; under commitment, the whole cost of uncertainty is instead 
borne by the economy. For this reason, random shocks introduce a new element in favour of 
discretion, additional to the advantage related to the output level described in Section three. 
Hence the overall advantage associated to discretion is larger under uncertainty, implying that 
commitment is preferable only if the loss associated with discretion is larger too, which 
happens if, ceteris paribus, the risk premium embodied in the interest rate is higher; this 
situation occurs only if the initial debt level is sufficiently high, and anyway higher than 
without uncertainty.  
The additional advantage associated to discretion in the presence of uncertainty can be 
illustrated with the help of figure 3. The occurrence of exogenous random shocks, impacting on 
output, will determine a corresponding shift in the position of the BY schedules, which will 
range from BYi-ε and BYi+ε (with i=0,1). A Government committed to stabilize public debt 
will not take any action to offset the consequences of the shock, so that output will fluctuate 
between C’ and C’’. On the other hand, a Government  acting under discretion can take 
measures to partially stabilise output by choosing the optimal position situated along the GRF 
line, between D1 and D2. Hence under discretion output variability will be limited in the range 
D’-D’’, which is much smaller that the analogous range C’-C’’, occurring under commitment. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studied the relative advantages and costs of rules versus discretion in the 
conduct of fiscal policy within a framework in which agents expectations about Government 
choices affect the risk premium paid on public bonds. The achieved results are relevant under 
many perspectives.    20
In the first place, in the proposed model, the Government will choose a level of the 
public deficit larger than announced because of its desire to increase output beyond the current 
equilibrium level. Since this time-inconsistent behaviour is correctly anticipated by rational 
agents, it will generate a “deficit bias”, due to the increase in the risk premium paid on public 
bonds, as a consequence of the debt growth entailed by the increased deficit. This “deficit bias” 
is analogous to the “inflation bias” generated by monetary policy in the traditional time 
inconsistency literature and provides a new argument in the analysis of the reasons behind the 
emergence of public deficits. In fact, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) show that a “deficit bias” 
can  arise when there are differences in political parties preferences about the composition of 
public expenditure, such that an incumbent Government will not fully internalize the cost of 
bequeathing debt to the new entrant. Persson and Svensson (1989) show that a conservative 
Government will run a larger deficit if it knows that it will be replaced by a liberal one. This 
paper shows another potential source of a deficit bias, due to the ability of financial markets to 
incorporate the effects of time inconsistent Government behaviour into the risk premium paid 
on public bonds.  
In second place, the  deficit bias  generated by fiscal dynamic inconsistency does not 
imply that the equilibrium under discretion is always inferior to that under commitment, 
because output is different in the two cases. Since the value of the deficit depends on the level 
of the initial public debt, the relative desirability of either commitment or discretion depends 
upon that level as well. This result is different from that obtained in the case of monetary 
policy where, without uncertainty, commitment is always preferable.  
The introduction of uncertainty in the model does not change the conclusions just 
reached. However, the threshold level of public debt that makes commitment preferable is, in 
the case of uncertainty, higher than in the absence of exogenous random shocks.  
Furthermore, from a normative point of view, our results highlight the elements 
necessary to identify the economies that will benefit from a commitment to fiscal policy. In   21
this perspective, we point out a new reason why economies with a large amount of outstanding 
public debt should fix binding rules to their fiscal policy, while, on the contrary, discretion 
would be a better alternative for economies endowed with a small stock of public debt.
21  
Finally, our analysis also shows that the advantages of commitment are lower if the risk 
premium connected to a non-stabilized debt is small or if the financial markets response to a 
change in expected debt dynamics is not very large. The benefit of a fiscal policy rule also 
depends on Government (or society) preferences and is greater if the relative importance 
assigned to the debt stabilization goal is higher. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1. 
A simple inspection of eq. (15) shows that the difference  ( )()
dc L D -L D  is positive for 
bt-1→∞  and is an increasing function of bt-1.  
The further conclusion that the difference  ( ) ( )
dc LD LD −  is negative for bt-1=0 can be 
derived from the following observations. First, for bt-1=0 we have no effect of the risk premium 
on debt growth (the term  ( ) tt 1 b b − γ∆ is zero); this implies that commitment does not reduce 
the interest payments with respect to discretion. Given this result, and since D
d is, by 
assumption, the optimal choice of the Government given the loss function, we have 
that ( ) ( )
dc LD LD ≤ . Finally, under the hypothesis that  ( )
c Y* L D > , D
c cannot be the 
optimal level of Dt. This excludes the possibility that  ( ) ( )
dc LD LD = . 
The three results we have just shown, according to which the difference  () ( )
dc LD - LD  
is negative for bt-1=0, positive for  bt-1→∞  and increasing in bt-1, prove Proposition 1. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3. 
We first prove that ceteris paribus, for any given value of bt-1,  () ( )
uc ELD - ELD ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
is lower than  () ( )
dc L D -L D  . Given the expected loss function (17) we have:   24
() ( ) ()
22
uu e u
tt - 1 ELD = Eah ( D) + γ∆ bb + f D- Y * + ε ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
    [20] 
where D




cc c 2 ELD = E fD - Y * + ε =L D +σ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
       [ 2 1 ]  
where the last equality holds since Eε=0. 
In order to determine  () ()
uc ELD - ELD ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  we first compute the expected loss 
obtained when the Government chooses D
d (determined by condition (12)) under uncertainty. 
Since  0 ~ E = ε  we get: 
() ( ) () ()
22
dd e d d 2
tt - 1 ELD = Eah ( D) + γ∆ bb + f D- Y * + ε =L D +σ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
    [22]                                                    
Eqs. (21) and (22) imply that  () () () ()
dc d c ELD - ELD = LD - LD ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . However, 
since D
u is different from D
d (cf. eq. (19)) and is the optimal choice under uncertainty we have 
that  ( ) []( ) [] u d D L E D L E >  implying that  ()() () ()
dc u c LD - LD > ELD - ELD ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  for any 
given value of bt-1.  
This conclusion has relevant implications for the comparison between the value of b ˆ  
under certainty ( c b ˆ ) or uncertainty ( u b ˆ ). Indeed, for  c
1 t b ˆ b = − , we have  ()()
dc L D =L D  and 
() ()
cu ELD > ELD ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . Since  ( ) [] u D L E  is increasing in bt-1 this implies that  c u b ˆ b ˆ > . 
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Figure 1.  Possible outcomes when commitment is preferable. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Possible outcomes when discretion is preferable.   26
 
 
Figure 3. The trade-off between commitment and flexibility under uncertainty. 